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Professor Dau-Schmidt makes a persuasive case for a more effective
mechanism for employee voice. As befitting a lawyer, his solutions to
the problem of the relative lack of employee voice are primarily legal.
Historically, labor unions have served as the primary instrument for
employee voice, but in recent years, unions have suffered substantial
losses of membership and power.' The recent failure to enact even a
modified version of the Employee Free Choice Act, despite an
overwhelmingly Democratic Congress and a Democratic president who
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. I would like to thank Professor Paul
Secunda and the Marquette Law Review for the invitation to participate in the symposium
and the participants for their insightful questions and comments which certainly improved the
article. I would also like to thank my colleague Professor Dale Margolin for her insights on
the article's thesis, William Warwick, University of Richmond, Class of 2012, for valuable
research assistance, and the University of Richmond School of Law for financial support.
1. Both critics and supporters have identified numerous reasons for the decline. See,
e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone & Scott L. Cummings, Labor Activism in Local Politics, From
CBAs to "CBAS" 2-7 (UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 10-34.), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1719822&http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/pape
rs.cfm?abstract_id=1719822) (last visited Mar 10, 2011); CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS
SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 34-35 (1993);
PHILIP M. DINE, STATE OF THE UNIONS: How LABOR CAN STRENGTHEN THE MIDDLE
CLASS, IMPROVE OUR ECONOMY, AND REGAIN POLITICAL INFLUENCE, at xxvi-xxviii
(2008); JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS 16-22 (2010); WILLIAM B.
GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND
THE LAW 35 (1993); DANIEL NELSON, SHIFTING FORTUNES: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
AMERICAN LABOR, FROM THE 1820S TO THE PRESENT 131-55 (1997); Cynthia Estlund, The
Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1529-30 (2002); Michael H.
Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 59 n.1, 62 n.14 (1993); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of
Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal
Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575,578-79 (1992); Paul Weiler, Promises to
Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1769, 1769 (1983). See generally Julius G. Getman, Explaining the Fall of the Labor
Movement, 41 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 575 (1997).
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were elected with crucial political support from unions, demonstrates
the weakness of organized labor. Despite Professor Dau-Schmidt's
convincing argument that employee voice is essential for the public
good, unions seem unlikely to play a major role in creating that voice
without significant changes in their strategies and tactics, their size, how
they are perceived by the public, and the greater political climate.
Moreover, the law is unlikely to change in the ways Professor Dau-
Schmidt suggests without a revitalized labor movement. This Article
argues that unions have been too dependent on the law and lawyers-a
strategy that will ultimately be unsuccessful without a large, active, and
loyal membership base and a network of supportive organizations
advocating for the same causes.
For many years, my husband and I disagreed about the role of
lawyers in the labor movement. As a long-time union officer, he
asserted that labor lawyers ruined the labor movement. In his view, the
labor movement needed only criminal lawyers. As a union-side labor
lawyer, I resisted this notion mightily, arguing that lawyers only advised
their clients, who then decided independently whether to follow the,
lawyer's advice. Over the years, however, perhaps aided by distance
from my role as a lawyer representing unions, I have come to believe
that he was on to something. While I disagree with his argument that
the labor movement does not need labor lawyers, I have concluded that
law's influence on the labor movement has not been entirely beneficial.
The law is seductive. I use the term legal seduction in the title
intentionally. Seduction means to "entice" a person or organization to
do something not in their best interest or to abandon their duty.'
Institutionalized unions have relied too heavily on legal action, contract
enforcement, and electoral politics and, consequently, too little on
engaging their own membership, organizing new members, and building
coalitions with other organizations with similar aims.' Lawyers and the
law have influenced the strategy decisions of the labor movement.
While legal strategies can be one arrow in a quiver, in order for labor
unions to play a significant role in providing employee voice in the
future, they must broaden their vision. Law, and even collective
bargaining agreements, must be instruments of the movement, but
2. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1732 (2d ed. 1993).
3. My argument is, in part, a call for a return to social justice unionism, an argument that
has been effectively made by other scholars. See, e.g., GETMAN, supra note 1, at 1; MICHAEL




favorable law and contracts cannot be ends in themselves. Instead, a
combination of returning to the tools that built the movement and
adapting to the changed conditions of the global economy will enable
trade unions to provide an important, and much-needed, counterbalance
to corporate power.
This Article begins by briefly describing how legal and political
action has come to be a central strategy for labor unions. Next, it
analyzes the ways in which the law has failed the labor movement,
reviewing various laws that have been enacted to protect employees,
often at the behest of unions, and how those laws have been perversely
twisted to the detriment of workers. The Article, then, looks at unions
and employee movements that have succeeded in the face of
unfavorable laws and analyzes the determinants of those union
successes. Finally, based on these strategies, the Article provides
suggestions about how the labor movement can expand its role in
today's economy.
II. WHY LAW?
I do not seek to establish as an empirical matter that labor unions
have focused "too much" on the law. "How much is too much" is a
variable determination that depends on the situation. My argument is
rather a cautionary tale: the law is limited as an avenue for change,
especially when that change is sought without widespread political
support from union members and other advocates. Its seductive power
can distract from more important work that is necessary to sustain the
labor movement. Excessive focus on the law can drain energy and
resources from the grass roots movement, which is essential for change.
Law is needed to support, but not shape, the movement's strategy. In
addition, it should not be the principal strategy used to achieve the
broader goals of the movement.
In part, my sense of the importance of law to labor comes from many
years of working with the labor movement and hearing the refrain-
"just wait until the next election; once when we elect the right people,
things will improve." In support of my intuitive conclusion, data on
union spending reflects substantial expenditures for both political
contributions and campaigns,' and lawyers and litigation.! It is also
4. I consider political spending in the discussion of the law because its purpose is
typically to elect those who will favorably influence law through legislation or appointment of
judges and administrative agency officials. Labor unions accounted for seven of the top fifty
organizations and two of the top ten organizations donating to state and federal political
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evident that for many years increasing membership and developing
relationships with other organizations with similar interests were not a
priority for the labor movement. In 2005, the labor movement split,
campaigns, political parties, and ballot measures in 2007 and 2008. FollowtheMoney.org, Top
National Donors, http://www.followthemoney.org/databaseltoplO000.phtml (last visited May
13, 2011). The top donor was the National Education Association, a public sector union,
contributing over $56 million. Id. The Service Employees Union was number five on the list
with over $35 million donated. Id. Total contributions of unions, however, are dwarfed by
the contributions of businesses. As just one example, the finance, insurance and real estate
industry alone donated more than all labor unions in 2008 and thus far in 2010. Compare
FollowtheMoney.org, Industry Influence Table 1: Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
Contributions to All Candidates and Committees, http://www.followthemoney.org/
database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=0&s=0&g[]=6 (last visited May 13, 2011) (stating that
contributions from the finance, insurance and real estate industry totaled over $254 million in
2008 and more than $228 million in 2010), with FollowtheMoney.org, Industry Influence
Table 1: Labor Contributions to All Candidates and Committees,
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=0&s-0&g[=12 (last visited
May 13, 2011) (stating that contributions from labor totaled over $224 million in 2008 and
more than $188 million in 2010). Political spending per union member has increased in recent
years, as have overall political contributions which includes volunteer assistance in political
campaigns. Morris M. Kleiner, Follow the Leader: Are British Trade Unions Tracking the
U.S. Decline?, in TRADE UNIONS: RESURGENCE OR DEMISE? 199, 203 (Susan Fernie &
David Metcalf eds., 2005). Political influence has not increased with increased contributions,
however, because of the membership decline. Id. Based on data from LM-2s filed by labor
unions with the U.S. Department of Labor, I have calculated the percentage of expenditures
on political campaigning and lobbying by several national labor unions over the course of
three years. The percentages vary by union and do not include expenditures by local or state
affiliates. The UAW's percentages for 2009, 2008, and 2007 respectively are as follows:
3.46%, 3.41%, and 2.08%. The Service Employees Union's percentages for 2009, 2008, and
2007 respectively are as follows: 19.17%, 20.63%, and 12.44%. The IBEW spent the least for
2009,2008, and 2007 respectively: 1.65%, 1.10% and 1.13%.
5. I have calculated the percentage of total expenditures spent on litigation and staff
lawyers by several national labor unions over the course of three years by reviewing data
from the LM-2s filed by labor unions with the U.S. Department of Labor. As noted in note 4,
the percentages vary by union and do not include expenditures by local or state affiliates.
The UAW's percentages for 2009, 2008, and 2007 respectively are as follows: 2.41%, 2.26%,
and 1.88%. The Service Employees Union's percentages for 2009, 2008, and 2007
respectively, are as follows: 4.41%, 2.62%, and 2.87%. The IBEW spent the least for 2009,
2008, and 2007 respectively: 0.63%, 0.82% and 0.33%. Total expenditures for both litigation,
and political campaigning and lobbying in 2009, 2008, and 2007 respectively, are as follows:
UAW, 5.87%, 5.67% and 3.96%; SEIU, 23.58%, 23.25%, and 15.31%; IBEW, 2.28%, 1.92%,
and 1.46%. These figures do not include the staff time other than attorney time spent on
legal actions, including contract enforcement, which is a major part of staff responsibility for
most unions, and may understate the costs in other ways as well.
6. George Meany, long-time president of the AFL-CIO, stated in 1972: "I used to worry
about the size of the membership. But quite a few years ago I just stopped worrying about it,
because to me it doesn't make any difference." CRAVER, supra note 1, at 3. Meany's view
reflected a high level of complacency in the labor movement with respect to growing the
membership and developing additional support. Id.; see also GETMAN, supra note 1, at 19,
305-07; NELSON, supra note 1, at 148-156 (describing union difficulties since the 1950s in
organizing and limited, and unsuccessful, efforts by many unions to reverse the trend);
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with seven unions leaving the AFL-CIO to form a new federation,
Change to Win.' One major disagreement that led to the split was the
AFL-CIO's greater focus on political activity as contrasted with the
Change to Win unions' focus on building membership." Yet following
the split, the Change to Win unions spent more money on political
activity than they did before the split.! Clearly the law remains an
important focus of the labor movement.
The labor movement's dependence on the law is not surprising.
Alexis de Tocqueville long ago recognized the unique role that the law
plays in American society.
Scarcely any question arises in the United States which
does not become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial
debate; hence all parties are obliged to borrow the ideas,
and even the language, usual in judicial proceedings in
daily controversies.... [T]he spirit of the law, which is
produced in the schools and courts of justice, gradually
penetrates beyond their walls into the bosom of society,
where it descends to the lowest classes, so that the whole
people contract the habits and the tastes of the
magistrate.0o
De Tocqueville further suggests that lawyers and the law exert
almost imperceptible control over American society." And thus, law is
pervasive.
Law's pervasiveness in American society contributes to its seductive
power. Successful use of the law enhances this power. A few significant
legal victories make it is easy to believe that legal action is the answer to
Michael Selmi, Unions, Education, and the Future of Low-Wage Workers, 2009 U. CHI,
LEGAL F. 147, 162 (noting the union shift in focus from organizing new members to servicing
existing members). As one critical union official discussing the labor movement's failure to
organize remarked, "There are international union presidents who actually have publicly said,
'[w]e can't organize unless there is labor-law reform. We just can't.' So, what they believe
their mission is, is politics." GETMAN, supra note 1, at 19, 306-07.
7. For a description of the formation of Change to Win, see SCHIAVONE, supra note 3,
at 50-55.
8. Id. at 52-53; Ellie Levenson, Interview: Andy Stern, NEW STATESMAN, Sept. 12,2005,
at R10.
9. Linda Casey, New Labor Union Employs Old Strategy, FollowtheMoney.org, Jan. 9,
2008, available at http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=351.
10. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 223-24 (Bruce Frohnen ed.,
D.C., Regnery Publ'g, Inc. 2002) (1889).
11. Id. at 224.
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most problems and that if only the right candidates win the election,
unfavorable law can be changed. But as critical legal scholars and
others have long recognized, law is a tool of the powerful." And, if ever
labor unions were among the powerful, they certainly are no longer." In
the nineteenth century, the law was used to frustrate labor organizing
and to prevent employees from combining into unions to increase their
power vis-a-vis their employers. 4  Time after time, nascent employee
efforts to pressure their employers were enjoined and or punished by
the courts. Despite these legal hurdles, however, labor unions grew in
fits and starts in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." As
labor unions grew and their power increased, unions achieved what was
viewed as a great political victory, the enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935. The statute was a radical
transformation of the law relating to labor unions. It passed despite
substantial opposition from employers and despite the legal inability of
unions to use combinations of employees to pressure employers. Early
decisions under the statute from both the National Labor Relations
Board and the courts were largely viewed as victories for organized
labor." The heady aura of success encouraged unions to utilize the new
statute and heralded an era of union activism in organizing, negotiating
12. See Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion,
Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 837-38 (1998) (discussing the popular
perception that law favors the rich and powerful); Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites:
Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633, 658-59 (1994) (stating that law is not a
set of rigid rules but instead a flexible system that can be manipulated by skilled attorneys
who represent the rich and powerful); Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply?
A Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 129, 150-51 (2010) (noting that the poor are less likely to utilize legal
assistance or to view legal assistance as a solution to their problems); Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional
Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1860-61 (2008) (stating that reforms, even those that are
neutral in effect and beneficent in intent, cannot be enacted without the support of powerful
interests); Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
DUKE L.J. 1, 27 (1992) (noting that legal reform, no matter how limited, is impossible without
the support of the rich and powerful).
13. This is not to suggest that labor unions currently have no power, but that power has
been substantially reduced as unions have shrunk in size and resources.
14. JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW 1
(2d ed. 1999).
15. See NELSON, supra note 1, at 3-4; SCHIAVONE, supra note 3, at 9-10.
16. Karl E. Klare has argued that some of those early decisions contained the seeds of
"deradicalization" of the statute. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act
and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 270
(1978).
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collective agreements, and litigation." Labor unions, for a time, had the
power to influence legislators and to some extent that power came from
the law and the consequent ability of unions to organize members using
legal means. Organizing brought resources, and resources increased
power. The law helped build a powerful labor movement that was able
to obtain political influence and succeed in litigation, as well as building
membership and negotiating favorable contracts. In short, the NLRA
began to shape the goals and strategies of the labor movement.
Law legitimizes."' With the passage of the NLRA, labor unions
moved from "outlaw" organizations to accepted parts of society-from
outsiders to insiders. Using the tools of the law, labor unions were able
to build resources which enabled continued access to the powerful and
success in negotiating agreements for their members. As legitimate
societal organizations, labor unions became more shaped by societal
norms." Being an insider is enticing and provides benefits; acceptance
of those benefits cements the organization's position as an insider.' As
insider organizations accumulate resources, their willingness to take
risks is reduced, as there is more at risk. Conservatism sets in.2
17. See SCHIAVONE, supra note 3, at 10 (describing the 1930s and 1940s as the "glory
years for organized labor and working people").
18. See Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 641,647-48 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
19. The literature regarding social norms is extensive and there is substantial debate
about the explanation for compliance with social norms, which occurs even where such
compliance is at odds with the best interests of the actor. See SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL
SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW, at xi-xii (Eric A. Posner ed., 2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 passim (1996). Norms generally operate
within communities, however, and the sanctioils for violation of norms may be effective only
for those who are or desire to be a part of the community. See SOCIAL NORMS, supra, at xii,
xiv (discussing consequences and sanctions such as loss of esteem or status and shaming);
Sunstein, supra, at 914-20, 939-41 (discussing various reasons for compliance with and
departure from norms). In the period prior to enactment of the NLRA, when unions were
outsiders, they might be seen as norm changers. See id. at 929.
20. See SCHIAVONE, supra note 3, at 28-29 (discussing the iron law of oligarchy
formulated by Robert Michels which argues that hierarchical leadership and conservative
unions are inevitable). While I do not agree that this process is inevitable, there is a strong
tendency in this direction, although as Schiavone shows, there are also regular efforts by
challengers within at least some unions to change direction. Id. at 29.
21. Id. at 28-29; Howard Kimeldorf & Judith Stepan-Norris, Historical Studies of Labor
Movements in the United States, 18 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 495, 505-06 (1992) (stating that
American unions are driven by the desires of their memberships for traditional goals of
higher wages and benefits and in the absence of a radical insurgency, they become
conservative institutions working with corporate employers to achieve the goals of business);
Judith Stepan-Norris & Maurice Zeitlin, "Red" Unions and "Bourgeois" Contracts?, 96 AM. J.
SOC., 1151, 1154-55 (1991) (stating that that the more established unions become within the
capitalist system, the more conservative they become as they become a part of the system
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Preserving the organization (and its assets) for the good of all becomes a
major goal. The advice of lawyers becomes crucial in reducing risk.
As insiders in a system of collective bargaining constructed by the
law, unions naturally began to rely on the law to conduct their business.
Organizing proceeded largely using the statutory mechanism of Board-
conducted elections. Collective agreements became the source of rights
and arbitration became the favored method of enforcement of those
rights. Unions focused on negotiating and renegotiating contracts to
confirm the terms and conditions of employment. Bargaining, too, was
shaped by the law. Strategic bargaining positions and tactics were used
to position the union and employer for any necessary legal actions
relating to bargaining failures or strikes. And when problems arose,
arbitration and litigation were the solutions. Strikes, when they
occurred, related primarily to obtaining a new contract because
agreements contained no-strike clauses, and even when contracts did
not contain the clause, the courts read them into the agreement.2
Various tactics for collective action were outlawed by statutory
amendment or interpretation, restricting unions to the use of the one-
shot strike.23 When strikes failed, unions made strategic offers to return
to work in order to place an onus of back pay on employers. The
unions' strategies and tactics were thus shaped by the law.
I am not suggesting that the union should not utilize the law as an
aid to bargaining and to obtain the best outcomes for its members.
Instead my argument is that the law should be only one piece of the
strategy and not the guiding light. As William Forbath has stated:
In the past, the institutional framework and policies of
labor law played a substantial part in shaping the
character of the labor movement.... Thus the imagining
they once challenged).
22. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 106 (1962) (holding that, although the
contract did not contain a no-strike clause, it did contain an arbitration clause to settle
disputes between the employer and the union, and therefore the union was foreclosed from
striking during the term of the contract).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (7) (2006) (restricting secondary boycotts and recognitional
picketing); JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPrIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 44-
66 (1983) (describing the role of employer-influenced assumptions in outlawing of collective
tactics like sitdowns and slowdowns); WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 165-66 (1991) (describing statutory interpretation outlawing
secondary picketing and boycotts); James Gray Pope, Class Conflicts of Law I. Unilateral
Worker Lawmaking Versus Unilateral Employer Lawmaking in the U.S. Workplace, 56 BUFF.
L. REV. 1095, 1104-1112, 1126 (2008) (describing the decisions finding sit-downs, slow-downs,
and partial strikes unprotected by the NLRA).
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and scrutinizing of possible new institutions and new laws
should be done with all the canniness labor and its
friends can muster; for these institutions and laws may go
a long way toward shaping the identity and the capacities
for collective action of the labor movement of the
future.2 4
That law shapes behavior is not unexpected. Indeed, it is the role of
law to establish the rules that govern democratic society. William
Forbath and other scholars have documented the role of law in the
emergence of the American labor movement's voluntarist character.'
The harsh treatment of workers in the courts in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries led to a narrowing of labor's objectives and to
labor's adoption of legal strategies to obtain them.26 Labor was
ultimately successful in recasting the law to protect labor rights to
organize and strike, but a more radical vision of labor rights was lost in
the process." Law and its interpretation have continued to shape the
strategies of the labor movement. By focusing unions on their relations
with their employer rather than on broader class objectives, decisions
under the NLRA, even those by decision-makers sympathetic to
organized labor, have restrained the potential of the labor movement to
achieve broader aims and helped support the characterization of labor
as a narrow special interest.'
Professor Malin has documented the role of law in shaping the
strategies and goals of public sector unions." The law restricts
bargaining on subjects that relate to inherent managerial prerogatives,
thereby limiting the role of unions in these matters."0 To the extent
unions are allowed to bargain, they bargain about the effects of
management decisions. The incentive for unions is to negotiate
24. FORBATH, supra note 23, at 172-73; see also Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and
Labor: The United Farm Workers' Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law
in Union Organizing Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 69-70 (2005) (arguing that unions
should view favorable law as a "window of opportunity" to assist the union in building its
power).
25. See id at 6.
26. Id. at 6-7.
27. Id. at 163-65.
28. George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 187, 217-19 (1994).
29. See generally Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J.
1369 (2009).
30. Id. at 1389.
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protections for employees, rather than participating in the decisions
about what Malin calls the "risks of the public enterprise.""
Accordingly, for example, teachers' unions negotiate protections from
discharge and discipline rather than evaluation systems designed to
improve teaching. 2  Instead of partnering to create an effective
educational system, the union's role is limited to negotiating wages,
benefits, and job security for teachers. One can observe a similar
phenomenon in the private sector. Bargaining about entrepreneurial
decisions is not required, even where there is a devastating effect on
employee job security." The employer is always required to bargain
about the effects of the decision, however, and in many cases there will
be some uncertainty about whether bargaining over the decision is
required because the law applies a balancing test.' Thus, the incentive
for the union is to use legal strategies to delay and hopefully derail the
decision, rather than working with the employer to find a solution that
meets the employer's needs and preserves-jobs.
III. LAW IS NOT THE ANSWER
Law can be a tool of change, but there are major drawbacks to heavy
reliance on the law. First, law is inherently unstable. Both statutory and
decisional law change regularly, and often the change is the result of
changes in the decision-makers. It is well documented that decision-
makers exercise a great deal of influence over the interpretation of law.'
31. Id. at 1391.
32. Id. at 1393-94.
33. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666,686 (1981).
34. Id. at 679 ("Nonetheless, in view of an employer's need for unencumbered
decisionmaking, bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the
continued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-
management relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on
the conduct of the business.").
35. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 227 (2d. ed. 2006) (indicating that the way that judges frame issues leads to
varying statutory interpretation and that the ideologies and methodologies of the judges
influence statutory interpretation); Cass R. Sunstein, et al., Ideological Voting on Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 302-307 (2004)
(confirming the effects of ideology on judicial decision-making in many types of cases
including affirmative action, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, disability discrimination
and race discrimination); Adrian Vermeule, New Perspectives on Statutory Interpretation: The
Judiciary Is A They, Not An It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 563 (2005) (pointing out that the Supreme Court is
intrinsically and naturally unstable because of its composition-nine regularly changing
members with often widely varying backgrounds, experiences, and philosophies); cf Jonathan
T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional
[94:889898
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Second, those regulated by law eventually learn to avoid or minimize its
impact." And, third, there are various flaws in legal regulation,
including difficulty in regulating with precision due to lack of
information; regulatory delays due to bureaucracy; and resistance to
implementation, lack of resources for regulation, and capture of the
regulatory process by those intended to be regulated.'
Labor law provides a particularly illustrative example of the
problems of legal regulation. During the early days of industrialization
and worker unrest, judges regularly sided with employers, developing
common law doctrines which initially criminalized worker combinations
designed to assert workers' rights and later made them subject to quick
ex parte injunctions enforceable with contempt citations.8 Judges were
drawn from the employer class and had little sympathy for, or
understanding of, the plight of employees. 9 Ultimately, widespread
recognition of judicial hostility to employees led to support for changes
in the law. Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 and later
the NLRA. The judicial hostility toward labor resulted in labor's
support for an expert administrative agency to administer the statute.
The NLRA created the National Labor Relations Board (Board).
Although in theory the Board is an agency composed of experts, the
members are political appointees. 0 Thus, the process of decision-
making has an inherently political component and the vision of a panel
of neutral experts has not been realized.4' Board-initiated changes in the
law have been particularly common since 1980. The Reagan and Bush
Boards reversed a number of previous precedents.4' The Clinton Board
followed by reversing some of the cases decided by the Reagan and
Bush Boards, and in addition, reversing other longstanding precedents.43
Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239, 1245-46
(2002) (arguing that judges are generally impartial and consistent in their interpretation of
statutes).
36. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342,398,444 (2004).
37. Id. at 444-45.
38. GETMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 1.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2, 9.
41. See id. at 9-10; Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB
Policymaking and the Failure ofJudicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 427-428 (1995) (noting
criticism of the Board members for lack of experience and expertise in collective bargaining).
42. See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26
CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221, 248 (2005).
43. Id. at 249 n.137.
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The Bush II Board followed the same path." Appointments to the
Board have become highly politicized and long delays in confirmation
are common.' These delays have limited the ability of the Board to
decide cases, impairing its effectiveness."
A number of scholars have documented how the Board, and
particularly the courts, have taken the fairly radical language of the
NLRA and interpreted it narrowly, reducing the potential of the statute
to make major changes in the power of unions and the collective rights
of employees.' Employer property rights, not mentioned in the statute,
have ascended in importance over the years, to the detriment of
employee rights." Courts, which have played an important role in
interpretation of the NLRA, have retreated from support for collective
bargaining and collective rights.49 Evolution of collective rights has not
occurred for several reasons." Legislative efforts to amend the NLRA
have failed due to lack of support in Congress or presidential veto."
Labor supporters have never achieved enough support to either
override a veto or stop a filibuster.' The structure of the law, including
preemption of state law and jurisdiction limited to the NLRB, has
precluded development of the law through other means.
Other employment laws, enacted with substantial support from
44. Id. at 250.
45. See id. at 250-52.
46. Most recently and perhaps most egregiously, the Board had only two members for
twenty-seven months. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2639 (2010).
Despite the efforts by Board members to continue operations, the Supreme Court decided
that almost 600 decisions by the two-member Board were invalid. Id. at 2638.
47. See ATLESON, supra note 23; CRAVER, supra note 1, at 29; ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING
BACK THE WORKERS' LAW 17-18 (2006); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action
and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1572-80 (1996); Ellen Dannin, Hoffman
Plastics as Labor Law-Equality at Last for Immigrant Workers?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 393, 399
n.34 (2009) (documenting the courts' judicial amendment of the NLRA, particularly in the
area of limiting remedies); Michael C. Duff, Of Courage, Tumult, and the Smash Mouth
Truth: A Union Side Apologia. 15 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J.. (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 7-14, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1751662
(discussing the evolution of labor law and indicating that the changes weakening labor rights
were simply the result of powerful forces regaining the upper hand); Estlund, supra note 1, at
1535 n.33; Klare, supra note 16, at 270.
48. ATLESON, supra note 23, at 5-11. In this context, property rights include
assumptions about the employer's right to control decisions relating to the workplace. Id.
49. See Brudney, supra note 47, at 1572-88.
50. Estlund, supra note 1, at 1529-30.
51. Id. at 1539-42.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1530-31.
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unions to protect all employees, have been interpreted by the courts in
ways that limit employee rights and privilege employer interests. The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is a statute
enacted to protect employee benefits such as pensions and health
insurance.' The preemption provision of ERISA has been interpreted
so broadly, however, and the remedies section so narrowly, that the
result is a "grand irony."" State laws that might protect employee
benefits are preempted while ERISA provides very limited rights and
remedies, particularly in the area of health insurance.' In most cases,
employees can only compel the employer to comply with the existing
plan, which can be changed at any time. As Paul Secunda notes, the
goal of employer cost containment has trumped the protection of
employee rights."
Employment discrimination laws have received similar treatment.
In the case of these laws, however, civil rights advocates have been able
to secure legislative amendment in many cases. A series of 1989
Supreme Court decisions cutting back on employee rights under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 led Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Older
Workers Benefit and Protection Act, reversing most of the Court's
decisions." More recently, the Ledbetter decision was overturned by
Congress." A long series of restrictive decisions under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) led to an abysmal win rate for employee
plaintiffs under that statuteW In 2008, Congress amended the ADA to
54. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
55. Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of
ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 133 (2009).
56. Id. at 142-43.
57. Id. at 162.
58. Michele A. Estrin, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending
Cases, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2035,2050 (1992).
59. Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5 (2009) (superseding the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), which
held that charges of sex-based discrimination in pay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 must be filed within 180 days of the original discriminatory act rather than within 180
days of the last paycheck reflecting the disparate pay).
60. See Amy L. Allbright, 2004 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I-Survey
Update, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 513, 513-515 (2005) (finding plaintiff
win rates to be as follows: 1992-1997, 7.9%; 1998, 5.7%; 1999, 4.3%; 2000, 3.6%; 2001, 4.3%;
2002, 5.5%; 2003, 2%; 2004, 3%). The decisions of the courts have weakened the protections
of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and employers have prevailed at the trial
court level 93% of the time in Title I ADA cases. Ruth Colker, The Americans with
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reverse many of these decisions.6' Labor law, however, has not been
legislatively changed to reverse unfavorable decisions for either
employers or unions. Both unions and employers have maintained
sufficient power to block statutory change favorable to the other side,
meaning that neither has had sufficient power to push through favorable
changes.' The most recent example is the failure of unions to obtain
passage of the proposed Employee Free Choice Act.'
As Professor Dau-Schmidt has noted, citing Marc Galanter, the
more powerful (employers) will continue to litigate with the less
powerful (employees) until their position prevails." And, as discussed
above, employers have been quite successful in using litigation to turn
employee protective laws to their advantage. Dau-Schmidt also
correctly notes that unions can play an important role in developing
favorable law through litigation and lobbying for legislative change.65
But without sufficient power, their success in developing favorable law
through these means will be limited.
Recent scholarship on the Supreme Court has questioned the
conventional wisdom that the Court, unlike the legislative and executive
branches, is ruled by law, uninfluenced by the will of the majority." This
Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99-100 (1999).
61. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as
42 USC § 12101 (2008)) (overturning U.S. Supreme Court decisions in order to broaden the
term "disability," and thereby increasing the number of people covered by the Act).
62. Professor Estlund has persuasively argued that this legislative impasse has been a
major factor in the "ossification" of the law. Estlund, supra note 1, at 1532-44.
63. Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr., The Controversial "Card-Check" Bill, Stalled in the
United States Congress, Presents Serious Legal and Policy Issues, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 209,
210(2010).
As of this writing, proponents have been unable to obtain the votes
needed in the Senate to invoke cloture on a threatened filibuster and thus
obtain a vote on the bill itself. Nor, apparently, have they been able to
agree upon an alternative version on which cloture might possibly be
invoked, because no alternative has yet been introduced in the Senate.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
64. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A
Call for Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 779 & n.67 (2011); see also Gordon,
supra note 18, at 644 (discussing the weighting of the legal system toward the interests of the
rich and powerful, and the backlash triggered by even limited legal victories of those who
challenge powerful interests using the law).
65. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 64, at 807-08.
66. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 82 (2007) (arguing that
changing attitudes is ultimately what changes the law, even in the judicial branch, by creating
majority support for change); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving
Standards", 57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 366-70 (2009) (asserting that across a wide variety of civil
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analysis further suggests that a favorable legal climate for labor unions
will come only when unions have widespread community support.
Law is elitist. While the language of the law may be commonly used
in the United States, litigation is the province of lawyers. Scholars
studying the use of litigation for social change have concluded that when
litigation is a primary strategy, the individuals represented are often
disempowered and left out of the process.61 Yet a tension exists because
the legal expertise that is necessary to use legal tools to initiate change
creates the risk that they will dominate the process." Similarly, the
essential union leadership required to negotiate and administer
contracts may have the paradoxical result of disengaging the rank and
file.69 When workers are disconnected, their interest and participation
wanes and any campaign for change loses power. As unions
institutionalized, their focus became negotiation and enforcement of
contracts, along with enforcement of legal rights. Members had little
role in that process unless they served as union officials or had a
contractual claim. As a result, it is easy for members to lose interest in
the union and fail to recognize its value. If the union is unable to
mobilize its members to support collective action in their own workplace
or the political arena, its power in both arenas is limited. To the extent
that legal expertise is required, the distancing effect may be even
greater. Extensive litigation can also use resources that could be used
for other purposes, including direct action that involves and engages the
membership. And legal change is almost always a slow process.
Keeping members engaged as cases wind their way through the courts
liberties contexts, the Court explicitly and routinely decides constitutional protections based
on the views of a majority of the states); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Countermajoritarian
Classics (and an Upside Down Theory of Judicial Review) 2-5 (Aug. 31, 2010), (unpublished
working paper, on file with the University of Richmond Law School), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669560 (arguing that even seemingly countermajoritarian decisions
like Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade were actually majoritarian because they
were supported by a majority of the public, and only seemed countermajoritarian because
they were opposed by economic and political elites in the democratic branches of the federal
and state governments).
67. Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from
Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603,604 (2009); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V.
Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 455-56 (2001)
(summarizing critiques); Victor Narro, Finding the Synergy Between Law and Organizing:
Experiences from the Streets of Los Angeles, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 339,353-54 (2008).
68. COREY S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, LOW-
INCOME CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 22 (2009).
69. Getman notes that unions have placed too much value on professionalism which
results in a gulf between the leadership and the rank and file. GETMAN, supra note 1, at 326.
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or proposed bills segue through the legislative process can be
challenging, especially if the legal issue is a centerpiece of the campaign.
Finally, legal victory can seem like the end of the process, leading to
membership drift after accomplishment of the major goal.
An example of how a legal action can undermine an advocacy
campaign comes from the Garment Workers' Center in Los Angeles,
which conducted a campaign against Forever 21 after documenting the
abuses of workers employed in various factories that produced clothing
for the retailer.' Legal actions were a major part of the campaign
strategy." In reflecting on the campaign, organizers concluded that the
focus on legal actions created significant problems." Despite their
efforts, it was difficult to keep employees involved in the strategy
decisions especially as long periods of time passed while the litigation
was in progress." The employees could not have full decision-making
power because of the legal expertise needed." The priorities of the
campaign were driven by the lawsuit so that the focus became keeping
public attention on the dispute rather than developing leadership in the
organization." The employees began to see the organization as only a
service provider. The leadership and employees lost their connection,
and the organization lost membership." As a result, the organization
altered its strategy to focus more extensively on employee involvement
and leadership development."
When legal actions play a major role in union advocacy, lawyers
become important players in the decisions of the organization. Lawyers
are trained to win cases." They are judged by their success in litigation.'
Their view of organizational goals may be limited by their legal
70. Nicole A. Archer, et al., The Garment Worker Center and the "Forever 21"
Campaign, in WORKING FOR JUSTICE: THE LA MODEL OF ORGANIZING AND ADVOCACY
154, 160 (Ruth Milkman, et al., eds. 2009) [hereinafter WORKING FOR JUSTICE].
71. Id. at 160-4.





77. Id. at 162-63.
78. See SHDAIMAH, supra note 68, at 160, 169 (noting that lawyers are trained to focus
on the case, the facts relevant to the case, and the objective of winning the legal claim and
that legal victories encourage lawyers to continue their efforts).
79. Litigation may be "particularly ... disempowering" for clients. See SHDAIMAH,
supra note 68, at 22.
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training.' Their training encourages them to shape the facts to fit
existing legal claims rather than envisioning a goal and designing a
strategy to achieve it with the law as one tool. Additionally, what is
needed to win a particular case or series of cases may not be what is in
the long term interest of the organization."' Lawyers, with their
particular expertise, may influence decision-makers to place too great an
emphasis on the law in making decisions." Strategy decisions must be
made in consultation with lawyers, but by those who are looking at the
bigger picture.
IV. VISIONS OF SUCCESS
Favorable law is helpful, but not essential to organizing and labor
advocacy. And, in this regard, favorable law is preceded by union
organizing. As discussed above, the NLRA resulted from union
organizing and advocacy at a time when the law was overwhelmingly
unfavorable to unions. In the public sector as well, unionization
preceded favorable law in many jurisdictions? There is debate about
80. See SHDAIMAH, supra note 68, at 20. According to Shidaimah,
Professions and professionals have the authority and the knowledge to
decide what constitutes a legitimate problem or topic within their field, ...
The parameters of relevance set by professionals tend to ignore the
contexts in which problems arise and often fail to fully comprehend the
range of factors that clients deem relevant to their cases.... The ability of
lawyers to set the parameters of interest, sometimes against the wishes of
clients, is a symptom of, and can further exacerbate, an imbalance of
power between professionals and clients.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14
CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 403 (2008) (noting that legal training can narrow the lens through
which lawyers see problems).
81. See SHDAIMAH, supra note 68, at 2Q
82. See id. at 20, 23 (noting the tensions between the directive role and the role of
eliciting participation from groups, and the risk of domination by the lawyers); Gary Bellow,
Steady Work: A Practitioner's Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
297, 302 (1996) (noting the power of lawyers and their potential for influence and even
exploitation of clients, particularly those in less powerful positions).
83. See RICHARD C. KEARNEY WITH DAVID G. CARNEVALE, LABOR RELATIONS IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR 59-60 (3d ed., 2001); R. Theodore Clark, Jr. & F. Donal O'Brien,
Illinois Public Sector Collective Bargaining Legislation: The First Fifteen Years, in
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT STATES
195, 195-99 (Joyce M. Najita & James L. Stern, eds., 2001); Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the
Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 735, 737-38 (2009) (describing unionization and the development of public
sector law in Illinois).
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whether the law is primarily a cause of organizing or an effect.' But
almost certainly, it must be both." Without union organization, there
will not be sufficient support for changes in the law." But, on the other
hand, changes in the law can ease organizing?
In the public sector, unionization is present, and in some cases,
effective, even where the law remains unfavorable. In Virginia, for
example, the law bans collective bargaining for public employees.8 Yet
in some Virginia public workplaces, unions are thriving.' Union leaders
describe the need for continuous organizing to keep the membership
involved and active.' Without a collective bargaining agreement and
without any requirement for fair share fees?' unions are dependent on
continuing to involve the membership and provide them value to
maintain their support. One leader of the firefighters' union insightfully
noted that union leaders in other states were very comfortable with their
ability to negotiate agreements." The negotiation and enforcement of
the agreements was their focus rather than developing continuing
connections with and involvement of the members, which could be a
weakness as well as a strength. These leaders in other states were
surprised that the firefighters in Virginia were able to obtain such high
wages and benefits without the right to bargain.' Additional support
from the public arises from the unions' donations of time and energy to
community projects and nonprofit groups.5 Public support is mobilized
by the union when needed to encourage public officials to back union
objectives." In North Carolina, where public sector bargaining is also
outlawed," two successive governors have issued executive orders
84. PAUL JOHNSTON, SUCCESS WHILE OTHERS FAIL: SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNIONISM
AND THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE 25,26 (1994).
85. KEARNEY, supra note 83, at 29, 60, 62.
86. Id. at 62.
87. Id.
88. See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-57.2 (2002); Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arlington
County, 232 S.E.2d 30,44-45 (Va. 1977).
89. Hodges, supra note 83, at 753.
90. Id. at 751.
91. Id.




95. Hodges, supra note 83, at 750-51.
96. Id. at 751.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (2009).
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providing access and consultation rights to public sector unions."
Similarly, some unions in right-to-work states, where employees cannot
be compelled to pay for union representation," have successfully
maintained strong memberships through internal organizing." Thus,
while favorable law can ease organizing, it can also seduce unions into
reliance on the law to maintain membership, foregoing the internal
organizing that is needed to maintain strong connections with the
union.'
Similarly, worker centers and other worker advocacy organizations
have been able to successfully organize and advocate for low wage and
immigrant workers." One can scarcely imagine a group with less job
security and political clout than low wage, immigrant, and in some cases,
undocumented workers. They are easily replaced, may risk deportation,
have no funds to contribute to political candidates, and in some cases,
cannot even vote. Yet, these organizing efforts have not been without
success.
Worker centers are "community-based mediating institutions that
provide support to low wage workers."'0 o These institutions focus on
three prongs: service, advocacy, and organizing." Worker centers have
documented successes in changing conditions for low wage workers,
98. See Exec. Order No. 45 (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.govemor.state.nc.us/
NewsItems/UploadedFiles/9efcbl3-fe7a-4acb-8elf-c63a7db8de2c.pdf; Exec. Order No. 105,
(Aug. 18, 2006), available at http://www.govemor.state.nc.us/library/pdf/execOrderArchives/
2006/08-August/18-To%2OFacilitate%20Government%20Employee%20Access.pdf.
99. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006).
100. Michael M. Ostwalt, Note, The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing Labor Through NLRA
Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 DUKE L.J. 691,704-05 (2007).
101. In describing the history of unionization in the 1930s, Nelson Lichtenstein stated:
"Everyday, local leaders faced the task of justifying the union's existence to the rank and file
to retain their loyalty.... Grievance battles were the order of the day, and local officers
went about their jobs in an aggressive and energetic manner." Ostwalt, supra note 100, at 712
(quoting NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR'S WAR AT HOME 22 (2003)).
102. See, e.g., JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE
EDGE OF THE DREAM 79-80,82 (2006) (documenting the work of numerous worker centers
around the country); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 149 (2005) (describing the Long Island Workplace Project); WORKING
FOR JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 1-10 (describing various low wage worker campaigns in Los
Angeles); Narro, supra note 67, at 344 (describing two campaigns of worker centers in Los
Angeles). The United Farm Workers campaign leading to the passage of the California
Agricultural Labor Relations Act offers another example of success. See Gordon, supra note
24, at 10-48.




using law and organizing." Often, these centers join forces with other
worker advocacy organizations, including unions and community
groups.'" Workers from Long Island were able to change New York
law, achieving enactment of the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act, which
improved enforcement of the law requiring payment of wages for time
worked.'" This success came only after building a strong coalition of
labor, community, religious and even business groups, securing
favorable media coverage, and direct lobbying by immigrant workers
who had crafted the bill based on their own experiences and could
communicate their stories with passion to the legislators.1"
A coalition of worker advocacy and other community organizations
worked with car wash workers in Los Angeles after discovering many
legal violations and other abusive practices." The coalition successfully
represented workers to remedy violations of wage and hour laws, helped
obtain reinstatement for workers fired for attempting to improve
working conditions, and ultimately succeeded in obtaining legislation to
regulate the industry to limit the most abusive practices."o The
campaign also included a public education component."' As conceived
by the advocates, the legislation provided a vehicle for organizing the
car wash workers into a union, a campaign which was undertaken by a
traditional labor union, the United Steelworkers of America, thereby
creating a partnership between the worker centers, community
organizations and traditional unions."2
105. For a thorough review and analysis of various worker centers, see generally FINE,
supra note 102.
106. Id.
107. GORDON, supra note 102, at 69; Jennifer Gordon, The Campaign for the Unpaid
Wages Prohibition Act: Latino Immigrants Change New York Wage Law 1 (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 4, 1999), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/imp-wp4gordon.pdf. The article describes the act
that significantly increases penalties for unpaid wages from a 25 percent civil fine to a 200
percent civil fine and from a misdemeanor with a maximum $10,000 penalty to a felony with a
maximum $20,000 penalty. Id. The law also provides workers with more tools to collect back
pay owed. Id.
108. Gordon, supra note 107, at 1, 23.
109. Narro, supra note 67, at 360.
110. Id. at 362-64.
111. Id. at 368.
112. Id. at 366-79. It may be somewhat ironic to use this example as it involves a
campaign for legislation initiated by lawyers, which, as Narro points out, is at odds with the
literature on law and organizing that suggests that the work of lawyers should be integrated
into preexisting campaigns. Id at 371. Nevertheless, the actions of the lawyers were still a
means to an end and a part of an overall campaign to unionize car wash workers.
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Day laborers, a group excluded from the protection of the labor and
employment laws because of the nature of their employment, have
established a national network supported by the two major labor
federations."' Two community-based worker advocacy organizations in
Los Angeles spearheaded efforts to organize the day laborers, which
began as a small local effort and grew into the national organization that
affiliated with the AFL-CIO and was composed of day labor
organizations and worker centers around the country."' The campaign
had two prongs: encouraging self-organization through leadership
development and minimizing conflict between day laborers and
community members, using conflict resolution."' The advocacy
organizations worked to build the support and trust of the workers,
developing solidarity and community support."' As the campaign
developed, both lawsuits and lobbying for legislation were utilized to
accomplish the goals."' Legal and legislative actions incorporated
worker involvement through public protests."8
Most recently, Domestic Workers United, a nonprofit organization,
spearheaded a successful campaign in New York to enact the first
legislation in the country protecting the rights of domestic workers to
overtime pay, freedom from discrimination, and a day off each week."'
Domestic workers are excluded from the protection of virtually all labor
and employment legislation and most are immigrant women of color,
many with limited English proficiency, a group vulnerable to
exploitation.
The well-known and oft-reported Justice for Janitors campaign
illustrates the use of alternatives to the NLRA organizing process to
unionize a group of workers difficult to organize using traditional
methods. The union used a variety of tactics including public pressure
on building owners, civil disobedience, mass protests, community
113. Maria Dziembowska, NDLON and the History of Day Labor Organizing in Los
Angeles, in WORKING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 141.
114. See id. at 141-53.
115. Id. at 142.
116. Id. at 146-47.
117. Id. at 142, 145, 151,152.
118. Id. at 145, 151.
119. Albor Ruiz, Domestic Workers Bill of Rights Law Finally Grants Protection for






support, legal actions, and corporate campaigns.121 This campaign has
even successfully organized janitors in Houston, located in a right-to-
work state.'22 Not all tactics used by the union were lawful, and in
addition, the union used such creative strategies as picketing the
buildings at night, when the janitors were present, but rarely the tenants,
to avoid liability for a secondary boycott.'"
The Service Employees International Union organized a group of
primarily African-American security officers in Los Angeles with the
help of black community leaders, an accomplishment that required a
rebuilding of trust with the African-American community.12 4 Key
aspects of the campaign involved union support for the broader interests
of the community such as affordable housing, sharing of power between
the union and community leaders, active protests by workers and
community leaders, and the help of an Australian union to pressure a
large employer with interests in Australian financing.'2
V. EXPANDING THE ROLE OF LABOR UNIONS
The workers' rights advocacy campaigns outlined in the previous
section illustrate several different models of combining legal strategies
with organizing to achieve protection for workers. They demonstrate,
not that the law is irrelevant, but that powerful organizations with the
ability to influence terms and conditions of employment and obtain
legislation favorable to workers can exist even in the absence of strong
legal protection for workers' rights. The success of some public sector
unions in states that outlaw collective bargain confirms that favorable
law is not essential to a vibrant labor movement. Unions have focused
substantial resources on legal changes that would ease the path to
unionization. While there is no doubt that legislation prioritized by
unions in recent years, such as the Employee Free Choice Act and
banning striker replacement, would benefit the labor movement, it is
increasingly clear that the election of Democrats supported by unions
will not lead to favorable legislation at the federal level without more
widespread support for the goals of the labor movement.
In order to return to their former position as a powerful institutional
121. SCHIAVONE, supra note 3, at 46-49.
122. Id. at 47.
123. Id. at 48-49.
124. Joshua Bloom, Ally to Win: Black Community Leaders and the SEIU's LA Security
Unionization Campaign, in WORKING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 167, 169.
125. Id. at 183, 189-90.
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actor in the American economy, labor unions must develop broad-based
support.'26 Rebuilding such support will not be an easy task, but
favorable law will follow. As noted above, favorable law comes from
sympathetic legislators and legal decision-makers. Unions have
recognized this fact, but have not successfully developed and maintained
the continued broad-based support that leads to favorable law. Unions
must begin by engaging their membership. Unions must become
worker-centered.'27 Union leadership must involve and empower the
membership to take leadership roles and become engaged and active
participants, invested in the decisions of the organization.'28
A second step is organizing new workers and building coalitions with
organizations similarly interested in social justice." The vision cannot
be a narrow one. Many Americans are frustrated with the direction of
the country. Unions must find a way to articulate a vision to draw in
individuals from a wide spectrum of society.'" Widespread support will
lead to more favorable publicity for unions which will continue to build
support."' A return to social justice unionism holds promise for drawing
126. I do not mean to simplify this task or to suggest that labor's focus on law is the sole
or even the most significant reason for the decline of unionization in the United States. A
number of factors have contributed to the phenomenon, many of which were outside the
control of labor. See supra note 1. I focus here on actions that can be undertaken by the
labor movement.
127. GETMAN, supra note 1, at 325 ("[Unions] must be not only for the people,... but
also of the people . . . ."). Michael Duff says it this way: "The power of unions will never be
restored without the basic courage of a worker to create tumult in the workplace when
necessary." Duff, supra note 47, at 18.
128. Each of the successful campaigns discussed supra prioritized involvement of
workers.
129. In some cases coalitions with groups not known for their interest in social justice
may be possible and should be explored. The Workplace Project's campaign was able to
draw business support for the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act by emphasizing the message
that businesses that did not pay their employees earned wages competed unfairly with law-
abiding businesses. Gordon, supra note 107, at 14.
130. As noted by Philip Dine, unions have a unique history of "uniting people in
common struggles across racial and ethnic divides, enabling them to pursue the American
Dream, and helping them enter the middle class." Dine, supra note 1, at 258. As income
inequality grows and the middle class shrinks, unions have an opportunity to reignite the
vision of a more egalitarian society. Charles Craver suggests that unions must form
professional associations to appeal to white collar workers. Charles B. Craver, The National
Labor Relations Act at 75: In Need of a Heart Transplant, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 311,
339-44 (2010).
131. See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 53-54 (discussing the damage caused by unbalanced
negative media portrayals of unions); DINE, supra note 1, at xxxiv, 151, 175-190 (discussing
the lack of positive media coverage of unions despite many positive stories, analyzing the
reasons for the lack of coverage, and suggesting strategies to improve the situation); see also
Gordon, supra note 107, at 16-17 (discussing successful media campaign).
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greater public support and building coalitions with other organizations,
but there are many other possibilities for creative unions with broad
vision."'
The successful worker advocacy campaigns discussed above support
the conclusion that both organizing and coalition building are essential
to reinvigorating unions."' Public sector unions in states like Virginia,
without the ability to negotiate binding collective bargaining agreements
or to strike," use similar strategies. Organizing, however, is key."'
Only after gaining the trust and support of workers will legal actions,
whether lobbying, political activity, or litigation, be a viable strategy for
long-term success."'
Unions have begun to move in this direction. Crisis can open people
up to new ideas as they search for solutions. Traditional unions are
utilizing alternative methods of organizing outside the structure of the
132. See GETMAN, supra note 1, at 1; SCHIAVONE, supra note 3, at 61-62. Social justice
unionism focuses on building democratic organizations; organizing using rank and file
workers as key players; militancy in collective bargaining; and alliances with other
organizations, locally, nationally and internationally. Id. at 62; see also Katherine V.W. Stone,
Employee Representation in the Boundaryless Workplace, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773, 809-16
(2002) (describing a broader vision of citizen unionism not limited to dealing with particular
employers but encouraging collective action on a broader basis).
133. And as evaluations of these campaigns note, legal success does not necessarily lead
to increased membership and support. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 107, at 29-30.
134. While the workers affiliated with worker centers typically retain the right to strike,
the centers rarely choose such a strategy. FINE, supra note 102, at 257-59.
135, I recognize that there are differences between worker centers, public sector unions,
and private sector unions that may limit the utility of some of the strategies used by these
organizations. Public sector unions have more direct avenues of political action since their
ultimate employers are politically elected. Hodges, supra note 83, at 766-67. Most public
employees have some protection against at will termination and thus are less at risk when
they engage in union activity. Id. at 766. And public employers are typically less hostile to
unionization than private sector employers. Id. at 766. Worker centers often build on ethnic
bonds and are not subject to the restrictions imposed on traditional unions by the National
Labor Relations Act. Id. at 769. At the same time, traditional unions have some advantages
over the worker centers. "One of the major issues facing the worker centers is financing.
Traditional unions can rely on member dues for financial stability if they are able to organize
workers effectively or can lawfully negotiate a union security clause requiring payment of
dues by bargaining unit members." Id.
136. As noted above, focusing on enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement
poses some of the same risks as focusing on litigation. It moves the activity of the union
further away from the workers and concentrates resources on enforcement rather than
involvement of workers. Out of necessity, unions in states without such agreements use
resources, both financial and human, for continual organizing of the membership. Id. at 770.
This is not to suggest that unions should not enforce their agreements, but rather that
enforcement should not eclipse efforts to foster worker engagement.
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NLRA. 37 They are providing training and resources to members.'3
They are initiating and developing relationships with such diverse
groups as international organizations, 139 student groups,'" academics,"'
religious organizations,'4m nonprofits and other NGOs, 43 worker centers
and other worker advocacy groups." They are making efforts to
expand support among younger workers, women, and people of color
137. See GETMAN, supra note 1, at 32; SCHIAVONE, supra note 3, at 81; supra notes 121-
123 and accompanying text.
138. See Stone, supra note 132, at 808 (describing various union training programs).
139. See, e.g., SCHIAVONE, supra note 3, at 42 (describing international strategy of AFL-
CIO); Matthew Dolan, UAW Sets a Strategy on Foreign Car Plants, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2011,
at B1 (describing global actions planned by the UAW in support of organizing foreign car
manufacturers); U.S., French Labor Unions Complaints Allege Violations of Employees'
Rights by Sodexo, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 149, at A-7 (Aug. 4, 2010) (describing
cooperative efforts of U.S. and French labor unions to encourage compliance with
international labor standards); see also STEVEN K. ASHBY & C. J. HAWKING, STALEY: THE
FIGHT FOR A NEW AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT292-93 (2009) (discussing union efforts to
reach out to global unions during labor conflict with A.E. Staley).
140. See, e.g., ITUC Launches Campaign to Bring Youth into Unions, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 64, at A-12 (Apr. 6,2010) (discussing efforts of U.S. and international trade union
federations to include young people in the labor movement); AFL-CIO to Establish Advisory
Committee to Formulate Outreach to Young Workers, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 151, at B-
1 (Aug. 6, 2010) (describing efforts to reach out to younger workers); Union Summer 2010,
AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/unionsummer/ (describing summer internships for
students); Dolan, supra note 139, at B5 (describing UAW plan to create a global organizing
institute to bring in student interns from other countries to assist in organizing).
141. See DINE, supra note 1, at xxxiv-xxxv, 146 (discussing union collaboration with
academics on strategies to revitalize the labor movement).
142. See, e.g., ASHBY & HAWKING, supra note 139, at 292-93 (describing union's work
with religious coalition in labor dispute with A.E. Staley); James J. Brudney, Neutrality
Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 819, 828 (2005) (noting unions' increasing use of relationships with religious
organizations in organizing campaigns); Alisha Biggs, Three Michigan Hospitals Refuse to
Respect Workers' Freedom to Join Union, Report Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 141, at
A-5 (July 23, 2010) (describing how organizers and workers in the campaign reached out to
religious organizations to communicate the message that union organizing was consistent with
various religious faiths and supported by faith-based organizations).
143. See, e.g., SCHIAVONE, supra note 3, at 33-34 (describing union/community alliances
to develop affordable housing and to keep plants open); Brudney, supra note 142, at 828
(noting unions' partnerships with community groups in organizing campaigns); Stone &
Cummings, supra note 1 (discussing a number of collaborations between labor unions and
community groups to obtain living wage ordinances and community benefit agreements);
supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Michelle Amber, AFL-CIO, Day Laborers Group Sign Pact to Advance
Worker, Immigration Rights, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 154, at A-4 (Aug. 10, 2006)
(describing agreement between union federation and day laborers organization to work in




who increasingly make up a large part of the workforce."' These efforts
must be a major focus of the labor movement.
Legal seduction is not inevitable. Used correctly, law can be a
powerful tool of workers. Labor union strategy must be developed with
law as a one piece. The organizations discussed above demonstrate the
importance of using legal action as a tool, rather than allowing the law
to shape the organization's strategy. Indeed, the organizations
sometimes use tactics of questionable legality or even clear illegality.'4
Law is used creatively to support the broader goals and strategies of the
organization. And strategies to avoid the negative effects of existing law
are employed as well.
Unions must be careful when utilizing litigation, lobbying, and
political campaigning that these tools neither drive strategy nor eclipse
the role of union members as direct actors. Further, the full costs and
benefits of legal action must be considered in determining its use,
including the potential for distancing workers from active
participation. 14  Unions, in addition, must be sure that their lawyers
understand and utilize the ideals of progressive lawyering-listening to
and collaborating with the community and insuring client involvement
in decision-making, while providing expert assistance." While political
campaigning and lobbying offer more opportunities for direct action
than litigation, both can, but should not, be accomplished without
significant involvement of workers. Accordingly, keeping the workers
engaged must be the primary goal; legal actions and lawyers can neither
145. See Marion Crain, Whitewashed Labor Law, Skinwalking Unions, 23 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 211, 224-28, 228-29 (2002) (describing coalition of traditional union and
African-American religious community to address racial discrimination and economic
oppression and union efforts to organize immigrant workers by focusing on their unique
needs); Linda Foley, Stepping Up, Stepping Back: Women Activists 'Talk Union' Across
Generations, at 2-3 (Berger Marks Found. 2010) (critical report of a meeting of women
activists of all ages discussing the barriers to participation of women and young people in the
labor movement and strategies to address the issues); Maria L. Ontiveros, A New Course for
Labour Unions: Identity-Based Organizing as a Response to Globalization, in LABOUR LAW
IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 417,
418-21 (Joanne Conaghan et al., eds., 2002) (describing union campaigns using identity-based
organizing); supra notes 120, 140 and accompanying text.
146. To make a similar point, Professor Getman uses the example of the Solidarity
movement in Poland which not only successfully organized workers by risking imprisonment
for violating repressive laws, but indeed played a major role in the defeat of Communism in
Eastern Europe. GETMAN, supra note 1, at 307.
147. "Litigation is attractive only if it is the most effective means of advancing broader
objectives." Cummings & Rhode, supra note 67, at 615.
148. SHDAIMAH, supra note 68, at 22-23.
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dominate the focus of the organization nor limit effective strategies. 49
Sameer Ashar, building on previous work, describes a model of
clinical legal education that suggests a model for labor unions' use of the
law.'" The clinic would focus not on a particular area of law but on a
particular community, working with the community to support political
organizing into collectives which would then determine the legal needs
of the community to be served by the clinic."' Priority would be given to
the legal needs determined by the collective rather than cases of
unconnected individuals." Among the advantages of the approach are
the education about the interrelationship of law, politics, and justice; the
accountability to the community; and the positioning of the legal claims
within a larger campaign for justice. Following this approach-which is
used in Ashar's clinic to work with some worker centers, among other
organizations-unions should involve workers not only in decisions
about collective action campaigns but also in the decisions about how
and when to utilize legal action as a part of the campaign."' Involving
union members will not only engage the membership in important
decisions, but might also change the role of the law and lawyers. In
addition to litigation, lawyers might be more involved in training the
membership on legal issues, preparing position papers for lobbying
efforts and accompanying the membership to legislative meetings, and
researching the legality of various forms of direct action proposed by the
workers."
Another vision of use of the law by workers has been meticulously
documented by James Pope. As Pope has demonstrated, workers can
shape the law using constitutional and legal principles to create self-
government, make and enforce rules in unionized shops, and even
149. Some unions are using local law to effectuate change. See Stone & Cummings,
supra note 1, at 8-22 (providing numerous examples of union use of local law). Many of the
examples discussed by Stone and Cummings involve collaboration with community groups as
well. Use of local law eases the logistics of involving members in lobbying and litigation.
These groups have moved beyond traditional labor and employment law, using local
ordinances and land use authority to achieve benefits for workers.
150. See Ashar, supra note 80, at 356.
151. Id. at 356-57.
152. Id. at 356.
153. The duty of fair representation, requiring unions to represent all workers in the
bargaining unit without discrimination, bad faith or arbitrary decisions, may impose some
constraints on the ability to involve workers in decisionmaking about pursuing individual
cases. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1966).




interpret official law in light of the experience and norms of workers.'
While much of the worker-made law has been rejected by the formal
legal system, reinvigorating worker resistance may lead to a new role for
workers' law.
Worker engagement is a challenging ideal, particularly in large
organizations." Most of the examples I have cited involve organizations
much smaller than many national unions. But in the end if labor unions
are not about worker empowerment, they lose much of their value as
important institutions in our society. It, thus, behooves the leadership to
find ways to maximize the role of the members to insure that unions
continue their vital role as a counterbalance to corporate power.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Professor Dau-Schmidt has so persuasively demonstrated, the
labor movement has the potential to be a natural and necessary
counterbalance to the growing corporate power in America. At present,
however, it is doubtful whether the labor movement has the power to
effectively combat dominant corporations." While the legal changes he
suggests would aid unions, favorable legal change is unlikely given the
current weakened state of the labor movement. Indeed, I suggest that
unions have been seduced by the prospect of legal change to focus too
much on political activity, lobbying and litigation and too little on
building the movement necessary to make such change a reality. A shift
in focus might seem counterintuitive given the need to resist legal
change even more favorable to corporations, but without it, unions will
be unable to perform the essential role of offsetting corporate
domination.
155. Pope, supra note 23, at 1098-1103 (discussing unilateral "lawmaking" by unions);
Jim Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, and the Shaping of American Industrial
Relations, 1935-1958,24 LAW AND HIST. REV. 45,47-48 (2006).
156. In some ways, the reduced involvement of workers in union activities is a natural
result of the growth of unions into large organizations, necessitating decision-making by a
smaller group for efficiency reasons. The movement toward greater worker empowerment
will take time, and will most effectively begin at the local level. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 163
(noting that unions are large bureaucratic organizations with all the problems that accompany
such status).
157. As this article went to press tens of thousands of workers were rallying in Wisconsin
in protest of a proposed bill to strip most collective bargaining rights from state workers.
Many of the protesters were teachers whose actions might be construed to violate no strike
laws in the state. It remains to be seen whether this is a foretaste of a coming union
revitalization.
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